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World geopolitics and international relations underwent several 
transformations throughout the 20th century. Among the most important, 
the two great world wars and the rearrangement of the post-war world that 
followed, can be mentioned. The reorganization of the world system in 
the post-war period involved the Pax Americana and the making of a world 
order linked to the United States, in parallel with the rise of the USSR to the 
status of military and ideological power, disputing with the US the status of 
hegemonic power, in a bipolarity that disappeared with the breakdown of the 
socialist ideological bloc.
As the United States consolidated itself as hegemon (main hegemonic 
power)3, it had to deal with the consolidation of a systemic cycle of accumulation 
and its consequent downward trajectory. The first two decades of the 21st 
century marked the reemergence of other powers, with the resurgence 
of Russia and China: Russia recovering part of its sphere of influence 
in its surroundings, under the command of Vladimir Putin; and China 
consolidating itself as a global economic power, both playing an important 
role on the world geopolitical board. These countries took advantage of the 
gaps created by yet another structural crisis of world capitalism, materialized 
in the “crisis of 2008”, which consequences influenced the relative decline of 
1 Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Universidade Federal de Pelotas (UFPEL). 
Coordinator of the Laboratório de Geopolítica, Relações Internacionais e Movimentos 
Antissistêmicos (LabGRIMA/UFPEL).
2 Adjunct Professor at Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). Coordinator of the Laboratório 
de Geopolítica, Relações Internacionais e Movimentos Antissistêmicos (LabGRIMA/UFPEL).
3 Later on we will have a more detailed discussion on the issue of US “hegemony”.
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the United States’ ability to impose its majority will on the world system, as 
they have done since the end of World War II.
This essay aims to analyze the global geopolitical rearrangement that 
occurs in the wake of the US weakening, which allowed the emergence of the 
BRICS as a possible pole of power. To support this approach, World Systems 
Analysis (WSA) is used, developed mainly by Immanuel Wallerstein and 
Giovanni Arrighi. In addition to taking into account the geopolitical dimension, 
parallels are also drawn with the theories of international relations, in order 
to expand the explanatory potential of this analysis. As a related objective, it 
is possible to use all these instruments to assess the way in which the BRICS 
are articulating to face the pandemic of the new coronavirus. The Bank of the 
BRICS seems to establish itself, therefore, as a support pillar of the group and 
the main external financier of financial solutions to face the economic crisis 
that accompanies the global health crisis caused by Covid-19.
Thus, this work is divided into three sections. The first section seeks 
to interrelate the theories of geopolitics and international relations around 
the analysis of WSA. In the second section, the motivations and effects of the 
rearrangement of power in world geopolitics are addressed. Finally, in the last 
section, the roles played and the opportunities brought by the emergence of 
the BRICS in the international system will be highlighted, assessing how the 
new coronavirus pandemic influences this scenario.
Geopolitics and International Relations and The World 
Systems Analysis
The links between geopolitics and international relations could be 
foreseen by the presence of the geopolitical discipline in the curriculum of 
most international relations courses in Brazil. If this is due to the fact that 
the two fields of knowledge partially share the same phenomenon of study 
with regard to “power”, there is another issue that brings them together: the 
interdisciplinarity of these fields.
Geopolitics was never raised to the status of a science, always lending 
itself to be an important knowledge for several areas, while international 
relations were consolidated late in the 20th century as an university course, 
bringing, even due to its late institutionalization, the non-pretension of being 
considered science and its multidisciplinary enterprise  character (Starr 
1991). Born in the 19th century, geopolitics experienced a relative decline 
after the end of World War II, as it was appropriated by the Nazis in their 
expansionist project. Given its resurgence since the 1970s, it continued to 
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be “an ‘itinerant theory par excellence’, in the sense of having entered a wide 
variety of disciplines and geographic regions” (Gökmen 2010, 141).
Deepening this observation, we have that geopolitical theories inform 
and/or are informed by international relations theories, in an ahistorical 
process, producing dialogues between different schools, starting from 
Hans Morgenthau’s statements, in which points of intersection between 
traditional geopolitics and classical realism can be discerned, up to Immanuel 
Wallerstein, with his Analysis of World-Systems, which was incorporated 
into the (neo) Marxism of international relations and to critical geopolitics in 
Taylor’s (1994) reading. Critical geopolitics also has very clear relations with 
the constructivist approach to international relations, in matters relating to 
the formation of international identity in the area of security and strategic 
culture (Mahmadou and Dijkink 2006).
Analyzing the contribution of geopolitics to international relations, 
Castro (2012), despite maintaining the focus of his analysis in the Nation-
state, lists seven spatial dimensions that must be evaluated, from a geopolitical 
point of view, in addition to the mere question of power:
In the parameters of geopolitical studies linked to International Relations, 
it is not only necessary to assess the state’s military power. It is essential to 
mention, in addition, seven cardinal characteristics that, together with war 
power (hard power) and cultural power (soft power), reveal the projection of 
growth or the vulnerability of countries: location, total dimension, topography, 
climatology, the territorial cut (format), the demographic distribution and the 
national government (Castro 2012, 143).
On the intersections between these areas of knowledge, Teixeira Jr 
(2017, 152) points out that “geopolitics, Marxism and international relations 
would be found in the fruitful construction of critical knowledge about 
processes such as globalization, worldization and regionalism”. Therefore, 
we seek to understand, later, how geopolitics and international relations are 
found in WSA.
WSA emerged from the criticism of the social and economic analysis 
model used by the social sciences since the 19th century. Between 1850 and 
1945, the most important intellectual cleavages among academics since the 
19th century were: the past/present and the Western world/rest of the world. 
Within this logic, historians studied the past, while economists, political 
scientists and sociologists were responsible for studying the present.
History, economics, political science and sociology were focused on the 
Western world, while “Orientalists” and anthropologists studied the “rest of 
The (Re)Emergence of the BRICS and the Reorganization of Power in Contemporary 
Geopolitics
88 Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.9, n.18, Jul./Dec. 2020
the world”4. Until 1945, the boundaries between these disciplines were clearly 
defined. In the post-war period, according to Wallerstein, this model failed to 
account for the new reality that emerged with the process of independence 
struggles. 
Under attack, the current model of analysis of the social sciences 
began to weaken. For Wallerstein, “the biggest change in global social science 
in the 25 years after 1945 was the discovery of contemporary reality in the 
Third World” (Wallerstein 2002, 231).
As a consequence, research in the Western world was divided into 
three domains, according to the new configuration of the modern world: the 
market (economy), the State (political science) and civil society (sociology). A 
new context opened up in the post-45 period, with the independence struggles. 
The former colonies tried to defend their political and cultural autonomy in 
the midst of national liberation struggles and in international events, such 
as the Bandung Conference5 in 1955. It was a process of reaffirmation and/
or self-affirmation before the Western world, which was accompanied, on an 
intellectual level, by studies on these regions, Latin America, Asia and Africa.
In opposition to this movement, some sectors of the academy developed 
theories that justified the “delay” of the former colonies, with the idea of 
development in stages, as an evolutionary process. Thus, the Modernization 
Theory (MT) emerged, whose method of analysis was the systematic 
comparison between all States. MT started from the premise of a linear and 
universal model of development of all societies in the direction of economic 
growth. Thus, all former colonies would inevitably reach development by 
copying the “models of success” of the old metropolises, regardless of how 
each nation was inserted in the systemic structure of Capitalism.
Although for some analysts, WSA presents itself as an adaptation 
of MT, for presenting an explanation of the economic development process 
linked to the dynamic Center (rich countries), Periphery and Semiperiphery 
(underdeveloped countries) (Wallerstein 2002, 4), Wallerstein says that ‘[...] 
[the] “original intention of the analysis of world-systems [was] the protest 
against the modernization theory” [...] (Wallerstein 2002, 234). In this process, 
poor countries would have qualitative disadvantages in terms of exchange 
between products with little added value (raw materials, for example) and 
products with high added value (industrialized), from the most developed 
4 Anthropologists studied “primitive” societies and Orientalists studied non-Western “great 
civilizations”.
5 The conference brought together countless countries in the then Third World that did not 
accept the bipolarity between the US/USSR as a way of dividing the international system.
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nations (Center) of the capitalist world-system. The technological gap between 
nations would be the central point in the mechanism of economic and social 
backwardness and in maintaining this status quo.
The focus of the world-system began to be drawn, then, in the 1970s, 
with authors such as Samir Amin, André Gunder Frank and Theotônio 
dos Santos, “but it gains really great encouragement with the work of 
Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1989)” (Santos 2000, 55). The theoretical 
construction elaborated by Wallerstein, which in the international relations 
theories is framed in the neomarxist perspective (Nogueira and Messari 
2005)6, has three important influences in its constitution: Annales School, 
Marxism and the Dependence Theory (Vela 2001).
As already mentioned, WSA emerged as a theoretical corpus that 
put MT in check and then, more fundamentally, the entire structure built by 
the social sciences since the 19th century. As proposed by Wallerstein, WSA 
should contain three axes. One would have to do with space, another with 
time, and with epistemology:
1) The World-System (not the Nation-States) is the basic unit of social 
analysis; 
2) Nor are idiographic7 and nomothetic8 epistemologies useful for 
analyzing social reality;
3) The existence of discipline boundaries within the social sciences 
does not make any intellectual sense.
Wallerstein defined the world-system as [...] “[a] territorial division of 
multicultural work in which the production and exchange of basic goods and 
raw materials is necessary for the life of its inhabitants every day” (Vela 2001, 
4). The world in which we are now inserted, that is, the modern world system, 
had its origins in the 16th century. This world system was initially located in 
only part of the globe, mainly in regions of Europe and the Americas, having 
expanded over the centuries to reach practically the entire global space. It is, 
and always has been, a world economy. It is, and always has been, a capitalist 
world economy (Vela 2001, 111).
According to Wallerstein, the current capitalist world-economy (world-
system) originated from the crisis of the feudal system and the rise of Western 
Europe to global supremacy, between 1450 and 1670. After the hegemony 
of Italian city-states and the Netherlands, there was the British ascendancy, 
6 Although it has strands that are not always directly linked to Marx’s readings.
7 Necessarily linked to the creation of general laws of great explanatory scope.
8 It establishes general laws for the understanding of phenomena that can be reproduced. In 
general, it would correspond to hard sciences.
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characterized by a continuous process of expansion, restructuring and 
financial reorganization of the capitalist world economy. The periods of 
financial expansion (financialization) were times when competitive pressures 
increased, both on governments, as well as on companies and trade. These 
pressures favored English industrial expansion, which remained in the global 
economic supremacy until the beginning of the 20th century.
After the British hegemonic collapse, the US emerged as the main 
economic power and, after the Second World War, reached technological and 
military supremacy during the Cold War, becoming the superpower after the 
collapse of the socialist bloc in 1989 and the end of the USSR in 1991. For 
Wallerstein, as in previous hegemonic periods, American hegemony tends to 
dissipate and be replaced by another. For this reason, it is necessary to analyze 
the rearrangements of power in world geopolitics.
The Rearrangements of Power in World Geopolitics
As already noted, the changes that took place in the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries demonstrate that the capitalist world-system is changing 
(Wallerstein 2001, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Arrighi 1996, 2008). The 2008 
systemic crisis, which affected the center of capitalism in an intense way, 
corroborates this perspective mainly from the perspective of geopolitics. 
The 21st century presents a series of geopolitical scenarios that bring 
as a basic standard the relative weakening of the United States as a hard 
protagonist. The 21st century tends not to be the “American century” due to 
the serious problems faced by the US, not only in the economy, but also in the 
ideological dimension, which is another basis for the country’s acceptance as 
a natural world leader.
Even in the 20th century, the United States was not an isolated 
protagonist on the planet. The very idea of an American hegemony has been 
the subject of reassessment. Joseph F. Nye Jr., in his article Is the American 
Century Over? (2015), addresses this issue, indicating the term primacy as 
the most appropriate to designate the period. The existence of a socialist bloc 
between 1945 and 1989, coupled with the preservation of the Cuban and 
Chinese regimes, would put US hegemony in check. More precisely:
As we have seen, the term “hegemony” is a concept too imprecise to be 
used in the definition of “American century”. Sometimes, it means having a 
preponderance of power resources, sometimes the behavior of setting rules 
for others and, sometimes, getting the results you want. Because of this 
ambiguity, we cannot date when it begins or ends. Noam Chomsky further 
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argues that the ‘’loss of China ‘was the first major step in the’ decline of 
America’’ or in that period when many others are on the rise. If there was 
ever an American hegemony, it would have been since 1945, when the United 
States had almost half of the world economy as a result of World War II, until 
1970, when American participation in world output declined to its pre-war 
level of a quarter of world production. However, even during this period, 
the United States often failed to get what it wanted - as witnessed by the 
Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons; the communist control of China and 
half of Vietnam, the stalemate in the Korean War, the Soviet suppression of 
the revolts in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Fidel Castro’s control over Cuba 
and so on. So, instead of “hegemony”, I prefer to use the terms “primacy” 
or “preeminence” because of the disproportionate aspect (and what can be 
learned) of each of the three sources of power (Nye Jr 2015).
For Wallerstein, the decline of the US began in the 1970s and occurred 
according to the logic that “(...) the economic, political and military factors 
that contributed to the prominence of the US are the same factors that will 
produce the imminent decline of the US” (Wallerstein 2004, 21). Historically, 
the prominence of the US began with the world recession of 1873, when its 
economy grew sharply at the same time as the British economy entered an 
inflection. In the period between 1873 and 1914, the US and Germany became 
the main producers of steel and chemicals, dominating industrial processes.
The search for primacy has become a natural process. World War II 
provided a privileged position for the United States, which did not directly 
suffer the catastrophic effects of the war. Its territory did not suffer any 
damage in physical-structural terms, unlike Europe and Asia. According to 
Wallerstein, the post-war US success as an hegemonic power caused its own 
decay to begin:
The success of the US as an hegemonic power in the post-war period created 
the conditions for its own hegemony to be undermined. This process can be 
captured in four symbols: the Vietnam War, the 1968 revolutions, the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Each 
symbol adds to the previous one, culminating in the situation in which the 
United States finds itself today: a lonely superpower that lacks real power, a 
world leader that no one follows and few respect, and a dangerously adrift 
nation, immersed in a global chaos that can’t control (Wallerstein 2004, 25).
The four events pointed out by Wallerstein would represent each 
moment of the decline of American power, which bequeathed military 
spending in an increasing line and the ideological weakening of the capitalist 
system as the creator of a “free society”. Without the old Cold War clash, the 
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US was left alone on the global stage. With the entire focus of American 
foreign policy practically directed towards the Middle East, since the end of 
the Cold War, the White House has loosened its “control” over former less 
important areas of the planet, but which have gained some prominence on 
the international chess board because of the great communist “threat”.
The Barack Obama administration (2009-2017) tried to reverse this 
loss of ideological strength by seeking to use soft power9 as the easiest way 
to regain its prestige. But it did not prevent the emergence of new poles of 
power, such as the BRICS.
The (Re) Emergence of the BRICS and the (Post) Pandemic 
Scenario
Based on the decline of US influence in recent decades, the emergence 
of important players at the beginning of the 21st century and the questioning 
of their unilateral stances, the emergence of the BRICS represented a common 
perspective of a multipolar and multilateral world to face global problems. 
Despite the disbelief from part of the central core of capitalism, the BRICS 
gained geopolitical projection of great importance in the beginning of the 21st 
century. The states that make up this power bloc hold 26% of the territory, 
42% of the population and 14% of world GDP, as well as contributing more 
than 50% of the increase in world GDP between 2005 and 2010 (Visentini 
2015, 155).
For many conservative analysts, the BRICS did not have any possibility 
of organizing a common agenda that involved a major articulation on the 
international stage. The original proposal, made by economist Jim O’Neill, 
in 2001, through the Building Better Global Economic report, was a way of 
jointly analyzing such economies by the investment bank Goldman Sachs. 
Thus came the acronym for the four largest emerging economies in the world 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China), adding to South Africa in 2010, allowing 
the current configuration.
The inclusion of South Africa was of great importance for the group’s 
“globalization”, increasing its representativeness within the emerging world. 
According to Stuenkel,
South Africa’s inclusion was notable for three reasons. First, because it 
9 Term created by Joseph Nye, professor at Harvard University, to designate the capacity of a 
State to ideologically and culturally influence other nations without using coercive means to 
succeed in defending its interests. It is the opposite of the concept of hard power.
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weakened the importance of the civilizational aspect in international politics 
- after all, the BRICS originated, to use Samuel Huntington’s definitions, 
five distinct civilizations. It is in this respect that the BRICS diverges more 
radically from the common alliances of international politics (Stuenkel 2017, 
82).
Despite this expansion that took place in 2010 and sometimes it is 
suggested that other countries join the bloc (mainly through isolated Chinese 
initiatives), the hard core of the BRICS is in the so-called “strategic triangle” 
of the RIC (Russia, India and China). Brazil and South Africa enter more to 
fulfill the representation of regional powers in their (sub) continents. India 
could be classified under the same label, but it differs from Brazil and South 
Africa for its growth projections and for its strategic location with Eurasian 
partners. An analysis of GDP is not sufficient to demonstrate this discrepancy, 
as we see in table 1:
Table 1 - Gross Domestic Product - BRICS (2018) 
STATE GDP






Source: Prepared by the authors with data from the World Bank (2020): 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.
The distance from Russia, India and China to Brazil and South Africa 
can be better seen when analyzing the historical series of these growth 
indicators, as in graphs 1 and 210: Graphic 1 shows a different pace of growth 
for the RIC, starting in the 2000s, in relation to the other countries of the 
bloc. Graphic 2 confirms this trend by demonstrating the pace of GDP per 
capita growth in the BRICS countries.
10 Reproduced by Alves (2018).
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Graphic 1 - GDP share of BRICS members in world GDP (1980-2023)
Although India has a GDP per capita lower than all other countries, as 
shown in Graphic 2, it is projected a continued growth that will surpass Brazil 
and South Africa in the 2020s.
Charles Pennaforte, Ricardo Luigi 
95
Graphic 2 - Per capita income of the five BRICS countries (1980-2023)
This same euphoria in relation to the future of the BRICS is not 
shared by the main theorist of World System Analysis. Immanuel Wallerstein 
addressed the group of emerging countries in two articles, in 2013 and 2016, 
showing concern about the bloc’s geopolitical and economic aspirations 
(Wallerstein 2013, 2016):
The structural crisis of the world system is moving very fast, and in many 
ways uncertain, to assume sufficient relative stability to allow the BRICS, 
as such, to continue to play a special role, geopolitically or economically. 
Like globalization itself as a concept, the BRICS can become a passing 
phenomenon (Wallerstein 2013, 1).
China and Russia, the two most powerful countries in the BRICS 
today, face United States competition for areas of influence. Washington’s 
aggressive rhetoric and economic measures against Beijing demonstrate 
Donald Trump’s great concern for the country’s economic and geopolitical 
development in recent years. Despite the decrease in its economic growth, 
Beijing has been increasing its economic influence in various parts of the 
world, either through the project The New Silk Road or through its activities on 
the African continent, for example. In addition to its companies competing 
on an equal footing with Westerners (Huawei, for example), China has been 
taking advantage of the geopolitical and economic loopholes created by the 
United States in recent years to increase its influence.
Moscow has been impacted by a series of economic measures that 
seek to weaken the Russian national project carried out by Vladimir Putin. 
This has occurred with greater emphasis since 2014, when Russia annexed 
Crimea, given the possibility of a pro-Western government in Ukraine and at 
the doors of its territory. Washington, for example, has seen Moscow in recent 
years as a growing threat to American strategic interests:
Russia’s geopolitical challenge in relation to the United States is also growing. 
Since Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, Moscow has 
invaded and annexed Crimea; occupied parts of eastern Ukraine; deployed 
substantial military forces and undertook a relentless bombing campaign in 
Syria to support President Bashar al-Assad; significantly expanded its armed 
forces; carried out military exercises designed to intimidate the governments 
of Eastern Europe; interfered in Eastern European political systems; and 
threatened to cut gas for the most energy-dependent European states. Putin 
is a career intelligence officer deeply hostile to democratic changes in any 
territory close to Russia, paranoid about what he believes the US efforts are 
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to bring it down, and resentful of American domination of the post-Cold 
War world. He seems to consider it a personal priority to weaken the United 
States and combat American influence wherever he can (Blackwill and 
Gordon 2018, 1).
As China and Russia are the main protagonists of the BRICS, the 
weakening of both would represent the very decline of the bloc and its goals 
of building a new global governance in a multipolar and multilateral world. 
Wallerstein (2013) draws attention to the fact that geopolitics is not the only 
thing that matters, as we need to look at the domestic issues of the countries 
that make up the BRICS, the relations between the members of the bloc, and 
the relationship of the members of the group with countries outside the bloc.
Unlike Russia and China, which historically have a commitment to 
national unity, that is, a clear definition of the roles to be played by their States, 
Brazil does not usually recognize its attributions as a regional power. Brazilian 
participation in the BRICS fluctuated since Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment 
in 2016. Jair Bolsonaro’s government still has an ambivalent stance towards 
the bloc.
Although he said, during the eleventh BRICS summit, held in 2019, in 
Brazil, that his government is interested in expanding business with partner 
countries, he did not fail to make a contradictory statement, in saying that “the 
foreign policy of my government has its eyes on the world, but first in Brazil” 
(Colleta and Mello 2019, 1). Despite this, at the same summit, the Brazilian 
president also declared that the bloc’s interests coincide in the defense of 
a more inclusive global governance, and that its economic relevance is 
unquestionable and will continue to grow in the coming decades.
The Brazilian government needs to give stronger signals that 
protectionism and alignment with the United States are not so automatic as 
to compromise its commitments to the group, to overcome suspicions such 
as that exposed by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, then in the 
rotating presidency of the bloc at the tenth BRICS summit in South Africa:
If [Bolsonaro] acts against what the BRICS countries defend, this will be to 
the detriment of Brazil and Brazilians [...] He will join a BRICS family that 
is almost irrevocably committed to multilateralism, he will join a BRICS 
family that seeks to do things in a way that strengthens mutual benefit. If he 
starts pushing in a different direction, it will end up harming Brazil’s interest 
(Agência Brasil 2018, 1).
In the relationship of BRICS countries with the rest of the world, 
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there is an evident concern about the direction of globalization and the effects 
on the US performance system, something that was made clear in the final 
declaration of the 2018 summit. In the final text it is said that
We recognize that the multilateral trading system is facing unprecedented 
challenges. We reinforce the importance of an open global economy, allowing 
all countries and peoples to share the benefits of globalization (Pamplona 
2018, 1).
The 2019 Brasilia Summit’s final declaration deepens the issue already 
exposed in Johannesburg of strengthening the multilateral trading system, 
exposing the defense of WTO rules, in addition to announcing the twelfth 
summit meeting for St. Petersburg, Russia, in July 2020 (BRICS 2019). This 
regular meeting is at risk due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the new coronavirus.
In the relationship between the bloc members, there is little expressive 
intra-block trade and few social results in countries that can be related to 
participation in the group, as shown by Lobato (2018), emphasizing that “this 
can be attributed to the difficulty of making commitments for national contexts 
very different with very different structures of social policy systems” (Lobato 
2018, 2143). Low cooperation on issues that are not primarily economic could 
be seen in this pandemic context. There was a virtual meeting of BRICS 
ministers, other than those of health, but of foreign affairs, on April 28, 2020. 
Although it was announced that there were agreements on the defense of 
multilateralism, the advancement of BRICS cooperation, and the gathering 
of efforts in terms of global health in combating COVID-19, the effective 
measures were related to economic issues surrounding the BRICS Bank.
It is the economic initiatives, such as the New Development Bank 
(NDB), that point to a still growing intrablock concertation. The so-called 
BRICS Bank can still accelerate the institutionalization of the bloc, which 
until then functioned more as a forum for discussions than as a formalized 
institution.
The creation of the NDB was seen by some analysts as a timely 
reflection on the changes in world power, while others stressed the fact that 
the bank is yet another element illustrating China’s global ambitions in terms 
of projection of power (Da Silva 2019). The creation of a possible competitor in 
the provision of financial resources on a more just basis than those offered by 
the IMF andor the World Bank would alter the traditional center of monetary 
power configured since the end of WWII. As a consequence, the geopolitical 
center of power would be altered, accentuating the decline of the traditional 
core of capitalism. The consolidation of the NDB as a real alternative would 
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be an important gain for the Sino-Russian geopolitical architecture of creating 
another geoeconomic pole.
At a time when the world economy is suffering tremendous due to 
the spread of the new coronavirus that causes Covid-19 disease, causing a 
large number of infections and deaths and forcing the most diverse regions of 
the world to make drastic isolations of their population, international global 
cooperation acquires new importance, since, to face the crisis, the countries 
most affected, like Brazil, need financial assistance (United Nations 2020). 
The NDB reappeared with a prominent role in the pandemic context, being 
the one that offered the most advantageous perspectives of financial support 
to face the crisis, among the development banks that Brazil resorted to. In 
addition to the BRICS countries chancellors, members of the bank have held 
virtual meetings to develop financial solutions to face Covid-19. At first, the 
NDB made available, in April 2020, a US$ 1 billion credit line for each country 
in the bloc. A further disbursement of US$ 10 billion is expected to be divided 
between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Coletta 2020).
Table 2 - World production growth, 2018-2021










World 3.1 2.6 -3.2 4.2 -5.7 1.5
Developed economies 2.3 1.9 -5.0 3.4 -6.5 1.7
USA 2.9 2.3 -4.8 3.9 -6.5 2.1
Japan 0.3 0.7 -4.2 3.2 -5.1 1.9
European Union 2.1 1.8 -5.5 2.8 -7.1 1.1
Economy in transition 2.8 2.2 -3.5 3.1 -5.8 0.6
Russian Federation 2.3 1.3 -4.3 2.9 -6.1 0.9
Developing economies 4.3 3.7 -0.7 5.3 -4.7 1.0
Africa 3.1 3.0 -1.6 3.4 -4.8 -0.1
Southeast Africa 0.9 -0.1 -3.5 2.7 -4.4 0.8
China 6.6 6.1 1.7 7.6 -4.3 1.7
India (c) 6.8 4.1 1.2 5.5 -5.4 -0.8
Brazil 1.1 1.1 -5.2 2.9 -6.9 0.6
Memorandum items
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Annual percentage change Changes in the
World Economic Situation
World Trade (d) 4.1 1.3 -14.6 9.4 -16.9 6.2
Global growth based 
on Purchasing Power 
Paritye (e)
3.2 2.7 -2.6 4.3 -5.8 0.9
a Partially estimated. 
b UN DESA forecasts. 
c Fiscal year basis. 
d Includes goods and services. 
e Based on 2010 benchmark. 
Source: Adapted by the authors from  World Economic Situation and 
Prospects as of mid-2020 (UN): https://www.un.org/development/
desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/WESP2020_MYU_
Report.pdf.
The analysis of table 2 allows to project the impact of Covid-19 on 
the economy of the BRICS countries. According to the UN data, the average 
global GDP forecast is -5.7%. China is the only country that manages to have 
a better result forecast than the global average.
The BRICS moves between the expectations of corresponding to half of 
the world GDP in 2030, as the most optimistic prospects before the pandemic 
assumed (Bittar and Krafuni 2019), and the estimated decline of 5% of the 
GDP of the bloc members, in 2020, as points out the Analytical Center of the 
Government of Russia (Golub 2020). Taking into account that the statistics 
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund estimate about a 5% 
drop in World GDP for 2020, it can be assumed that the BRICS member 
countries have not suffered a great deal as a bloc, given the global scenario. 
China and India, in this sense, have good expectations for the recovery of their 
economy, offsetting the worse performance of Brazil, Russia and South Africa. 
The Covid-19 pandemic is another component in this geopolitical scenario in 
which the BRICS will have to demonstrate its ability to propose alternatives to 
the collapse of the world order, with a review of globalization, multilateralism, 
and the international trade regime.
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Final Remarks
The BRICS tries to establish itself as an alternative to the reorganization 
of the world system. In this context of unforeseen circumstances, the 
BRICS has to deal with the demands for its affirmation as an institution 
and international power bloc, in addition to being subject to the systemic 
transformations engendered by the United States, which are struggling to 
maintain themselves in the midst of this half hegemony.
Although Wallerstein himself is skeptical about the future of the 
BRICS, his analysis of world systems provides content to assess the relative 
decline of the United States and the emergence of new power blocks that may 
fill the void left by the decline in the US primacy. The theoretical construction 
elaborated by Wallerstein, with the help of geopolitical and international 
relations theories, provides us with tools to analyze the BRICS beyond the 
formal aspects of power, in terms of hard and soft power.
The BRICS countries face the challenge to uphold an utopian 
proposal, that still maintains itself as difficult. However, if the much expected 
economic consolidation of the China, Russia, India strategic triangle comes 
into reality, this proposal could last. For that, it is necessary to increase the 
internal trade between the countries participating in the group and catalyze 
the effects of overflowing the benefits of being part of the bloc, especially with 
the expansion of the performance of the New Development Bank. In relation 
to Brazil, it is necessary to understand the extent to which the bloc’s interests, 
expressed in the construction of a new global governance, more inclusive, 
defending globalization and multilateralism, coincide with Brazilian national 
interests. In the Brazilian discourse for the bloc, the synergy seems clear, 
which is not confirmed in the official statements outside the bloc, in which 
Brazil expresses ambiguities and contradictory interests in relation to its 
international insertion strategy.
Moving in a scenario of uncertainty, the BRICS seeks to be an actor 
capable of proposing alternatives in the midst of a collapsing order, in view of 
the rearrangements of power in global geopolitics. The countries that make up 
the group, called emerging countries, will need to (re) emerge in the face of the 
Covid-19 pandemic and its related crises,yet another destructuring element in 
this geopolitical board. The BRICS countries’ capacity for economic recovery 
in relation to the rest of the world may foreshadow the bloc’s future.
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ABSTRACT
The two first decades of the 21 st Century were marked by the recrudescence of two 
powerhouses, Russia and China. Given their important role on global geopolitics, 
these two countries took advantage of the gaps resulted from yet another crisis 
on the structure of global capitalism, which influenced the relative decline of the 
United States capacity to impose its will on the international system as they had been 
able to do so since the end of World War II. This article’s objective is to analyze the 
global geopolitical rearrangement due to a weakened United States which opened 
the possibility for the BRICS nations to emerge as possible sources of power. To 
reinforce this analysis, the world-systems perspective, (here on referred to as WSP) 
elaborated mainly by Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi is used, as well as 
a geopolitical approach to provide a link to international relations theories. Therefore, 
this paper is divided on to four sections. The first one interrelates the geopolitical 
theories and those of the WSP. The second section is guided towards understanding 
the origins and fundamentals of the WSP. On the third section, an approach is made 
towards the motivations and the effects of the rearrangement of power on the world’s 
geopolitics. Finally, on the last section, the roles and opportunities that have arisen 
from the emergence of the BRICS nations on the international system are presented.
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